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Abstract
We offer a microeconomic model of the two-sided market for
the dominant form of spam: bulk, unsolicited, and commercial
advertising email. We adopt an incentive-centered design ap-
proach to develop a simple, feasible improvement to the current
email system using an uncensored communication channel. Such
a channel could be an email folder or account, to which prop-
erly tagged commercial solicitations are routed. We characterize
the circumstances under which spammers would voluntarily move
much of their spam into the open channel, leaving the traditional
email channel dominated by person-to-person, non-spam mail.
Our method follows from observing that there is a real demand
for unsolicited commercial email, so that everyone can be made
better off if a channel is provided for spammers to meet spam-
demanders. As a bonus, the absence of filtering in an open chan-
nel restores to advertisers the incentive to make messages truth-
ful, rather than to disguise them to avoid filters. We show that
under certain conditions all email recipients are better off when
an open channel is introduced. Only recipients wanting spam will
use the open channel enjoying the less disguised messages, and
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for all recipients the satisfaction associated with desirable mail
received increases, and dissatisfaction associated with both un-
desirable mail received and desirable mail filtered out decreases.
1 Introduction
We all receive spam; we all resent it. Justice Potter Stewart, were he
alive, would know it when he saw it. Nonetheless, it is hard to find a
consensus definition of spam. Some want to include all unsolicited com-
mercial email; others include unsolicited bulk email; others distinguish
between deceptive, informative or malicious email. We should not be
surprised, then, that it is also hard to find systematic analyses of “the
spam problem”, when there are so many notions of what spam is.
Our modest goal is to identify a particular (but prevalent) subspecies
of spam, analyze its ecology, and propose a mechanism that may increase
substantially the social welfare by modifying the flows of this type of
spam. Our immodest goal is to lay groundwork for systematic modeling
of spam, and the consequent development of solutions that are effective
because they address systematic features of the problem.
We limit our consideration to spam defined as bulk, unsolicited, com-
mercial email ; that is, effectively identical (but usually randomly dis-
guised) messages sent unsolicited to large numbers of recipients with
the goal of inducing a willing, mutually-beneficial purchase by the re-
cipients. With this definition (we will call it “spam” for convenience,
but it’s merely one subspecies) we rule out malicious bulk unsolicited
email (e.g., email carrying a virus payload); we rule out deceptive email
(e.g., “phishing” messages that attempt to trick recipients into revealing
valuable personal information such as bank passwords); and we rule out
email (though initially unsolicited) sent to mailing list, which one could
unsubscribe from.
Defined as we have done, commercial spam is an instance of a
differently-named, well-known phenomenon: advertising. Using the less-
pejorative moniker “email advertising” might give us a good start on a
thoughtful, systematic consideration; certainly, it might help us recog-
nize that at least this type of spam is not per se evil or morally deficient
(though, as with any advertising, some population subgroups might con-
clude that the products advertised might fail that group’s morality test).
Nonetheless, we will use “commercial spam” or just “spam” for short,
because we relish the powerful affective response the term receives, and
the opportunity to puncture the pejorative bubble it engenders.
To develop a systematic analysis of (non-deceptive, non-malicious)
commercial spam, we need grounding principles. We find that surprising
insights follow from adopting just two familiar, simple economic princi-
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ples:
Revealed preference There is a non-trivial demand for the receipt of
spam email.
Rational choice Spam purveyors will send spammessages to whomever,
wherever, whenever, as long as the expected benefits exceed the
expected costs.
We expect that only the first principle will raise many eyebrows at
first, but we find that the second principle consistently has been half-
ignored in most prior literature on “the spam problem”.
First, demand. Spam is not costless to generate or deliver, despite
casual claims to the contrary. It is true that replication and transport
costs are extremely low, compared to non-digital advertising channels.
But there are a number of other costs: marketing and contracting costs
with advertisers, content creation costs, content disguising costs (to get
past technological filters), distribution technology costs (most spam is
now sent out by virus-created spambots running on many machines not
owned by the spam provider; these botnets need to be continuously re-
generated, which requires developing new viruses to distribute, among
other things). There may also be the cost of expected legal penalties.
Given the non-zero costs of providing a spamming service, and the fact
that we are limiting ourselves to commercial spam, from which the ben-
efit to the sender is the inducement of willing purchases by recipients,
we must conclude the following: by revealed preference, there is a non-
trivial demand for the receipt of spam email. Some consenting adults
must be purchasing enough Rolex knock-offs and counterfeit products
to pay the spammer’s costs. While the revealed demand could encom-
pass some spurious demand induced by malicious or deceptive products
(e.g. fake Viagra), a portion of the revealed demand should be real. No
buyers will believe that a $50 Rolex is authentic.
Casual evidence is consistent with our claim that there is non-trivial
demand for much spam: Cranor and LaMacchia [1998] show that the
largest fraction of spam content is commercial advertising for products
hard to find through other advertising channels. We refer to these as
“censored” commercial solicitations. Such “censorship”, incarnated as
filters and domain-blocking rules, are ubiquitous at the email service
provider’ level. Of course, the “censorship” of which we speak is not
necessarily explicit or government-supported. Explicitly censored exam-
ples include ads for non-prescription providers of regulated drugs, or for
providers of knock-off products that intentionally violate copyrights or
trademarks of well-known brands. An example that, while not govern-
ment censored, may have reason to avoid other advertising channels (or
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may not be accepted by other channels) is (legal) pornography. Sophos
[2005] finds that this pattern continues; for example, in 2005 medication
spam constitutes around 40% of all spam, and adult content for another
10-20%. Evett [2006] estimates that product spam constitutes around
25% of all spam, and adult content for another 19%1.
Recognizing that some recipients want to read spam, while many
others evidently do not, we immediately see that one opportunity for
social welfare improvement is to find a way to match commercial spam to
those who want it, and not to those who do not. The latter email readers
would benefit, and spam senders would also benefit by not incurring the
costs of sending to people who will not want to purchase.
As a corollary, we expect the willing recipients of commercial spam
to benefit as well: if spammers can find a way to send to those who are
interested in receiving the advertisements, then they can reduce their
costs and increase the information content and quality in their ads, to
the benefit of those who want the commercial information. Consider:
Yellow Pages are a fairly successful bulk advertising medium because its
ads are generally viewed only by those who want to see them, and the
advertisers have the incentive to make the ads clear and informative,
giving the viewers the information they desire. Spammers in contrast
incur substantial costs to disguise the information in their ads so that
filters cannot easily remove the ads from the email stream. But then the
readers who do want the information so they can make a purchase are
confronted with uninformative, low-value ads.
The second principle we offer as a foundation for systematic analysis
of the spam ecology is that spammers are for the most part rational
businesspeople, and they will send ads when the expected benefit to
them exceeds the expected cost. What insight do we obtain from this
unsurprising observation?2 We answer, first, indirectly: most other au-
thors addressing spam have focused on proposals to raise the cost of
spamming as a way of reducing the amount of spam produced. This
approach is principled, but incomplete. An equivalent reduction in the
benefits of spamming (e.g., by inducing those who want spam to read
it in a different channel) should have the same (qualitative) incentive
effect. If spam were flood waters, the existing solutions are in the spirit
of building stronger levees to raise the river banks, instead of diverting
1Evett [2006] compiles the statistics from sources including Google, Brightmail,
Jupiter Research, eMarketer, Gartner, MailShell, Harris Interactive, and Ferris Re-
search.
2We know, of course, that not every decision, in every circumstance, satisfies a
test for decision-theoretic rationality. We only require that costly business decisions
in general follow from reasonable comparisons of benefits to costs.
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the flood waters using a floodway. Both might properly belong in an
effective flood management policy.
We build on these two principles to construct a model for commer-
cial spam that includes advertisers, spam service providers, email service
providers and mail recipients who have heterogeneous tastes for receiving
spam.3 See Figure 1. We then introduce a simple but novel mechanism
motivated by the two principles above: an uncensored communication
channel through which commercial spam will be accepted without fil-
tering or other attempts to block. Such a channel could be as simple
as a standardized mail client folder that would accept all appropriately
labeled messages. See Figure 2. Our conjecture is that if well-designed,
then under some circumstances the introduction of an uncensored chan-
nel could result in substantial self-segregation by spammers, with email
advertisements mostly targeted at “spam boxes”, and much less at the
traditional (censored) channel. See Figure 3.4 Note that email from large
legitimate businesses such as eBay and IBM is not considered spam in
our earlier definition because it is only initially (but not persistently) un-
solicited. Though such email could be quite bothersome, especially if one
needs to receive a small portion of wanted email from such businesses.
There should be little dispute that if users could implicitly opt-in
for commercial spam by creating an uncensored folder, the spammers
would send mail to that channel. But why would they stop sending (or
at least send less) to the censored channel? Our conjecture is that if
enough of the latent demand for purchasing spam-advertised products
is reached through the uncensored spam box channel, then the remain-
ing commercial benefits obtainable from also spamming the traditional
censored channel may fall sufficiently low that they no longer justify the
incremental costs.
3In our current model we focus on the preferences and behaviors of recipients,
spammers, and advertisers. We use a reduced-form, non-adaptive representation for
email service providers.
4One might argue that the World Wide Web is close to an uncensored channel.
If so, why doesn’t the Web satisfy the demand for advertising? One obvious reason
is that some or many of the products using commercial spam advertising do not
want a durable, public presence. If they are moving their web sites to new domains
frequently, they need a communication channel through which to disseminate each
new, temporary location. Indeed, we observe cases in which the links for some
domains selling medications expired in Google’s index well before Google got a chance
to renew the links. MessageLabs (2005) shows that about 30% of spam domains
expire within 24 hours. More generally, we expect there to always be significant
demand for “push” advertising in addition to “pull” (search-based) advertising, as
evidenced by the multiple media for advertising that co-exist in equilibrium (Yellow
Pages, local newspapers, billboards, broadcast TV and radio ads, bulk unsolicited
commercial surface mail ads, etc.).
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Figure 1: Stakeholders in an e-mail ecosystem.
There is another reason for spammers to keep sending to the tradi-
tional censored channel: persuasion. We are assuming that recipients
know if they want to periodically purchase based on spam advertise-
ments, and thus can make an ex ante rational choice about which chan-
nel to read. This situation is known in the literature as informative
advertising5: consumers know they want information (price, location,
etc.) about particular products, and seek out informative advertising
to obtain the information they need. But there is another category:
persuasive advertising, intended to convince consumers to buy products
they previously did not realize they wanted. Since these ads are aimed
at consumers who might generally opt out of the open channel, it would
do little good to send them to the open channel (which these previously
uninterested customers shun), so the persuasive advertiser will generally
go to where the unpersuaded are (the censored channel).
Recall also, that if spammers do choose to target the open channel,
then we expect that they will also stop dissipating resources on un-
productive efforts to disguise the informative content of their messages.
Then those who wish to receive email advertisements will benefit from
the higher quality (informativeness). This increase in informativeness,
in turn, likely would induce a larger number of consumers to want to
receive commercial spam.
We construct a model so that we may formally identify conditions un-
5See especially the section under the sub-heading “Is advertising used to inform
or persuade?” on p. 28 of Taylor [1934].
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Figure 2: An hypothetical open channel.
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Figure 3: Separating the demand for and supply of bulk unsolicited
commercial advertising.
der which the conjectures above hold true (and conditions under which
they do not). Our main results are to characterize the degree to which
spam will be shifted to the open channel, and to demonstrate that all
parties benefit from the introduction of an open channel, so that it con-
stitutes a Pareto improvement.
2 Prior approaches to spam
To date, most research focuses on reducing spam generally, usually
through policy, technical or market mechanisms that raise the cost of
sending spam. Before we detail our model of a mechanism that diverts
spam to those who want it, and away from those who don’t, we review
other approaches.
2.1 Technological
Technological solutions have gained some partial success but the re-
sults are far from satisfactory even though they have been implemented
for some time. The proposals include rule-based, Bayesian, and com-
munity (“collaborative”) filtering, disposable identities using extended
email addresses [Bleichenbacher et al., 1998], DomainKeys Identified
Mail [Perez, 2005], Sender ID or Sender Policy Framework [Crocker,
2006]6, challenge-response [Dwork and Naor, 1993, Laurie and Clayton,
6As of now, spam-sending domains are ironically the biggest users of SPF tags
[MXLogic, 2005]
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2004], whitelists, and blacklists. See Cranor and LaMacchia [1998] for
an overview.
There is a fundamental problem with technological systems: they
typically rely on the cost to spammers of devising technological
workarounds. If the cost is high enough, the net benefit of spamming will
be insufficient and the quantity of successful (delivered) spam will fall.
However, the costs of technological workarounds falls rapidly, as technol-
ogy becomes exponentially cheaper and as algorithmic solutions to hard
computational problems rapidly improve. Thus, as the workaround cost
falls, the technological barrier becomes less effective and spam deliv-
ered increases. This fundamental cost dynamic creates a need for on-
going investment to create improved anti-spam technologies. While an
“arms race” may not be the first-best solution, we have not seem feasi-
ble methods to avoid this cycle, given the inevitable and rapid decline
in technology costs.
2.2 Legal
Legal rules are another approach to spam reduction. The U.S. CAN-
SPAM act required a formal recommendation from the Federal Trade
Commission regarding the establishment of a do-not-spam registry sim-
ilar in the spirit of the do-not-call and do-not-fax registries created pur-
suant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. Although The
FTC recommended against the creation of the list, other CAN-SPAM
rules took effect 1 January 2004. However, legal solutions alone are,
and likely will remain incomplete. First, to avoid prohibiting desirable
email communications, legal rules generally include safe harbor provi-
sions guaranteeing the permissibility of email exhibiting certain char-
acteristics. It is generally difficult or impossible to prevent spammers
from composing their messages so that they exhibit these characteristics,
thus creating a safe harbor for a large and probably growing quantity of
spam. Second, legal jurisdiction over spam-distributing organizations is
a crucial problem: spammers can easily change their locations to other
countries.
2.3 Markets
Some proposals based on economic incentives have been gaining atten-
tion. These share an important feature with our approach to the prob-
lem: they typically are based on a presumption that users have hetero-
geneous values for receiving various email messages.
In an experimental investigation of email stamps as a price for obtain-
ing a recipient’s attention, Kraut et al. [2005] found that charging causes
senders to be more selective and to send fewer messages. This method,
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however, requires non-spammers to pay a price as well. van Zandt [2004]
examines the design of an optimal tax that minimizes exploitation of at-
tention through information overload. Various email stamp systems have
been or are about to be implemented.7 Loder et al. [2006] propose an
attention-bond mechanism in which a sender deposits a monetary bond
to a third-party agent, to be released only if the receiver tells the agent
to do so.
Payment systems require substantial infrastructure for full imple-
mentation. The infrastructure necessary for widespread micropayment
is lacking, and for successful adoption into a service exhibiting network
effects, such as email, it is likely necessary that there be early wide-
spread, not incremental, adoption, which is difficult to socially engineer.
Also, there is a norm of free email service. Legitimate senders may resist
paying for outgoing email more strenuously than is strictly justified if
they took into account the system benefits to their recipients.
3 Theory
In our brief review of other approaches to spam we highlighted one com-
mon feature: they are generally based on raising the costs of spam-
ming, not on reducing the benefits. In addition, technological and legal
methods (and some market methods, but less so) implicitly assume that
certain mail (or mail senders) are uniformly undesirable; that is, they
ignore heterogeneity in recipient preferences. In this section we present
a model of the two-sided market for commercial spam, in which product
sellers pay spammers to deliver advertisements to email recipients, some
of whom in turn willingly choose to purchase the advertised products8.
We then analyze the effect of introducing an open (i.e., uncensored)
channel. The open channel approach is designed to lower the benefits to
spammers of sending mail to all recipients, and works only and precisely
because recipient preferences are heterogeneous: viz., some recipients
want to receive email advertisements.
7Two of the world’s largest providers of e-mail accounts, America Online and
Yahoo!, announced in early 2006 that they would give preferential treatment to mes-
sages from companies paying from 1/4 of a cent to a penny each. An email stamp
system was already implemented in Korea in 2003. Daum Corporation, the largest
portal in Korea, charges about 0.8 cents to the senders who send more than 1000
messages per day. Fees scale downwards if senders are ranked lower than the biggest
senders or more users rate the email as useful. Data cited by Kraut et al. [2005]
indicate that spam was reduced by about 40% from its peak in a half-year period
around the implementation.
8The email market is a typical problem of two-sided markets (e.g., Rochet and
Tirole [2003]), which is closely related to the chicken-and-egg problem. In essence,
the number of senders affects the number of recipients, and vice versa.
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3.1 Mail Types
Mail types coincide with senders’ types. Such types are defined by two
attributes: mass or targeted mail, and censored or uncensored content.9
The first attribute is mainly a cost attribute. The content creation
cost per copy of mass mail is much lower than that of targeted mail.10
Also, because of information asymmetry of each recipient’s preference
for spam, by definition, mass-mail senders’ best strategy is to randomize
recipients’ addresses.
The second attribute is whether the sender sends content of a type
that is censored (if recognized) by the email service provider.11,12
In all, we identify four types of mail:
Censored-content mass Examples include Viagra and erotic content
advertisements.
Censored-content targeted Examples include personalized adult ma-
terials, perhaps sent by a pay subscription service.
Uncensored-content mass Examples include advertisements from con-
ventional booksellers, non-profit fundraisers, and other legal and
less socially objectionable purveyors.
Uncensored-content targeted Examples include personal correspon-
dence.
Our design goal was to develop a social welfare-increasing mechanism
that induces censored-content mass-mail senders to reduce the supply
9By censored content we mean content of a type that conventional email service
providers routinely attempt to filter out of the recipient’s email stream. Such content
may or may not be illegal, and the filtering efforts generally will be imperfect. Thus,
as we make explicit below, some censored content may be unfiltered, and thus be
received.
10We do not require that it is possible to identify whether a message is mass mail
or targeted mail. It is easy to fool general purpose filters, and the recipient often will
not know until after incurring the cost of viewing the message.
11Recipient censorship (with, for example, personal spam filters) is not very im-
portant to our central results, as long as the value of spam that evades these filters
is, on average, negative to a segment of the population.
12Content-based filtering can rely on any available information headers and body
text. For example, Gmail, Hotmail and Yahoo! usually filter adult content and all
mail from some blacklisted senders’ (usually based on IP addresses). On the other
hand, we assume that senders can, at a cost, disguise content to some degree. In
practice, much spam can be automatically identified as being sent from a censored-
content mass-mail sender, but our results are robust as long as considerable spam
cannot.
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of their messages delivered to the current standard email channel (the
censored channel). Therefore, we simplify by making this assumption:
Assumption 1 Mass-mail senders send only censored content, and targeted-
mail senders send only uncensored content.13
3.2 The Recipients’ Problem
To model the user problem we suppose that recipient r chooses which
channel(s) to read in order to maximize utility, which depends on the
quantity of various categories of email:
U r(desired mail received, undesired mail received, desired mail not received)
(1)
The utility function is increasing in the first argument, and decreasing in
the others. Before explaining the arguments above, we introduce further
notations.
Channel j is either (o)pen or (c)ensored. Assume that for all recipi-
ents, there is a (perhaps small) fraction  of uncensored mail that is not
desired. We assume that individuals either desire (all) censored-content
mail in a given channel or not, and use the indicator φjt to represent those
preferences. If a recipient of type t ∈ {(h)igh, (l)ow} desires censored-
content mail in channel j, then φjt = 1; otherwise φ
j
t = 0.
14 We assume
that only high type recipients put a positive value on censored content
(φjl = 0, φ
j
h = 1). Whether mail (desired or undesired) is received de-
pends on the filtering technology employed by the email service provider.
We model this below, but for now simply refer to mail that gets through
as “unfiltered” and mail that does not as “filtered”.
Then the first argument of the full utility function (1), desired mail
received, becomes:
(1− )× unfiltered uncensored mail+unfiltered censored mail× φjt (2)
13There are interesting research questions associated with the other two email types
as well, but they fall outside the scope of our present analysis. Adding them to our
model for the questions we ask in this paper would complicate notation and proofs,
but would not change the qualitative results.
14We have an asymmetry between the fraction of desirable censored- and
uncensored-content mail in a channel: recipients may not want 100% of the un-
censored mail sent to them in a channel, but if they want any censored-content mail,
then want all of it. We do this to simplify the algebra, without losing anything
qualitatively important. In both cases, not all mail is desired: for uncensored, each
individual may not want some; for censored, some individuals do not want any. Thus,
there is the possibility of both Type 1 and Type 2 errors for each.
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The second argument of utility function (1), undesired mail received,
becomes:
× unfiltered uncensored mail+unfiltered censored mail× (1− φjt) (3)
The third argument of the utility function (1), desired mail not received,
becomes:
(1− )× filtered uncensored mail+filtered censored mail× φjt (4)
In the censored channel filtering technology is designed to distinguish
between censored and uncensored content, but it does so imperfectly.
Each sender knows that the filter has a strength of γc ∈ [1,∞) for
censored content, and strength γˆc ∈ [1,∞) for uncensored content, with
γc ≥ γˆc. The filter strength is simply the inverse of the fraction of mail
that gets through the filter. By definition there is no filtering in the
open channel, γo = 1.15
Sender s can make an effort to disguise its content to reduce the fil-
ter’s success rate. We let sender s choose a disguise level, djs ∈ [ 1γj , 1],
for mail sent to channel j, where djs is a multiplicative factor adjusting
the filter strength. If djs = 1, disguising has no impact and the effective
filter strength is the technological strength γj. If djs = 1/γ
j, the effective
filter strength is one, which is to say, all content passes through unfil-
tered. Disguising is costly; we assume that there is no effort made to
disguise content in the open channel (by definition of the lower bound
of djs, d
o
s = 1 because γ
o = 1 implies that the upper and lower bounds
coincide).
Earlier on, we assumed that censored-content mail is sent only by
mass-mail senders, who evenly distribute such mail to all recipients. We
therefore define njr =
P
m n
j
m
Rj
as the volume of censored-content mail sent
to recipient r in channel j, where njm is the censored-content mass-mail
sent by sender m to channel j, and Rj is the number of recipients us-
ing channel j. Then the portion that actually reaches recipient r is n
j
r
djγj
,
where dj is the weighted average of disguise levels. Similarly, except of
course that targeted mail does not have to be averaged out across recip-
ients, we use the hat symbol to denote the corresponding uncensored-
content variables: nˆjr, dˆ
j and γˆj. Since we assume that there is no need
to disguise uncensored content, dˆj = 1.
15 An approach, which is perhaps less radical in practice, is to extend the current
model such that 1 < γo < γc. Our central results should still hold for γo to be
sufficiently small. The magnitude of which, however, is an empirical question. We
therefore only solve for the baseline case of γo = 1, which should have the same
qualitative effects.
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In our informal specification (1), recipient utility depends on the
undifferentiated volume of various mail categories. However, by intro-
ducing content disguising, we cannot avoid another dimension of quality:
the value of a given type of mail to a recipient will now also depend on
how informative it is, which generally will be inversely proportional to
the amount of disguising the sender does. That is, cluttering a message
with extraneous garbage text to get past a filter also makes it difficult
for the recipient to find the useful information. Therefore, we allow util-
ity to depend on the informativeness-adjusted volume of email received.
To adjust for message informativeness after disguising, we introduce an
information preference function, which is increasing in the effort made
to disguise censored-content mail. To allow for more generality that will
be clear shortly, we specify that this function can be different for dif-
ferent mail. Namely, the functions are I(dj) and I¯(dj) for filtered and
unfiltered mail.
We define κjr = 1 if recipient r uses channel j, zero otherwise.
Now we can formally express the utility function (1). The first argu-
ment, which is informativeness-adjusted desired mail received, becomes:
urdesired received =
∑
j∈{o,c}
(1− )κjr
nˆjr
γˆj︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncensored-content mail
+
∑
j∈{o,c}
φjtκ
j
r
I(dj)njr
djγj︸ ︷︷ ︸
censored-content mail
(5)
in which the first term is (desirable) unfiltered uncensored-content mail,
and the second term is unfiltered, censored-content, and disguised mail
for high type recipients (i.e., those who find it desirable to facilitate
purchases ).
The second argument of the utility function (1), which is
informativeness-adjusted undesired mail received, becomes:
urType 1 errors =
∑
j∈{o,c}
κjr
nˆjr
γˆj
+
∑
j∈{o,c}
(1− φjt)κjr
I(dj)njr
djγj
(6)
in which the first term is undesirable unfiltered uncensored mail, and
the second term is unfiltered, censored-content, disguised mail for low
type recipients (who suffer from receiving it).
The third argument of utility function (1), desired mail not received,
becomes:
urType 2 errors =
∑
j∈{o,c}
(1−)κjrnˆjr(1−
1
γˆj
)+
∑
j∈{o,c}
φjtκ
j
rI¯(d
j)njr(1−
1
djγj
) (7)
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where the first term is desired filtered uncensored mail, and the second
term is filtered censored-content mail for high type recipients.16
To simplify the model, we rule out the unlikely scenario that no one
is using the existing email channel:
Assumption 2 The censored channel is essential so that every recipient
uses it. That is, κcr = 1.
We also make another assumption that will greatly simplifying the
notations and algebra:
Assumption 3 There is no uncensored-content mail in the open chan-
nel. That is, nˆor = 0.
This assumption is justified in two senses. First, when there is less
spam in the censored channel, uncensored-content senders will not want
to use the open channel if the risk of it being filtered out in the open
channel is getting less. Second, uncensored-content mail will be mingled
with possibly much censored-content mail, uncensored-content senders
will need to weigh the chances of the mail being filtered in the censored
channel and being mingled in the open channel, especially if sending to
an additional channel (even without filtering as in the open channel)
incurs extra costs.
Assumption 4 The information preference functions take the following
form: I(dj) = (dj)β
r
and I¯(dj) = (dj)β¯
r
.
The basic idea of the information preference function is to specify
how an individual makes the tradeoff between information and volume.
The above assumption implies that the (dis-)utility associated with un-
filtered censored-content mail, which is I(d
j)njr
djγj
, becomes (dj)β
r−1 njr
γj
. For
βr = 0, such (dis-)utility becomes n
j
r
djγj
. Recipient r cares about the ef-
fective unfiltered volume not the information content. For βr = 1, such
16One could elaborate by allowing Type 2 errors associated with targeted mail to be
more annoying. This is because mass mail always appears in multiple and sometimes
almost identical copies in a given recipient’s inbox. This higher substitutability
implies that there is a low Type 2 error cost associated with mass mail. That is, one
could redefine spam as mail with lower Type 2 error cost. In other words, mass mail
wrongly filtered will cause much less inconvenience than the counterpart of targeted
mail, even for those recipients who want mass-mail. The converse is not true. Some
recipients prefer even to neglect targeted mail from some people they know.
Mathematically, one could define the first term to increase at a higher rate than
the second term in urType 2 errors.
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(dis-)utility becomes n
j
r
γj
, recipient r is indifferent or neutral to any dis-
guise levels associated with unfiltered censored-content mail. For βr ∈
(0, 1), (dj)β
r−1 ≥ 1, such (dis-)utility is weakly greater than njr
γj
. That is,
conditional on the same volume of mail sent (njr), high (low) type recipi-
ents would rather (not) have a higher volume of disguised mail unfiltered
than a lower volume (since γj is not adjusted by the disguise level that
equals 1) of undisguised mail unfiltered. For βr > 1, such (dis-)utility
is weakly less than n
j
r
γj
. That is, conditional on the same njr, high (low)
type recipients would rather (not) have a lower volume of undisguised
mail unfiltered than a higher volume of disguised mail unfiltered.
Similarly, the information neutral cuttoff for the dis-utility associated
with filtered censored-content mail is β¯r = β¯∗r ≡ log( 1−
1
γj
1− 1
djγj
)/ log dj.17
If the comparison to the “information neutral” benchmark cases of-
fers a useful tool to understanding the tradeoff between volume and infor-
mation, having a different function for filtered and unfiltered mail, just
as what we did using I(dj) and I¯(dj), allows a consistent description of
a given individual’s preference for information across mail types. For ex-
ample, a theorist could require that a given individual must be either one
of the following: {(βr = 1 and β¯r = β¯∗r), (βr < 1 and β¯r < β¯∗r), (βr > 1
and β¯r > β¯∗r)}. On the other hand, one could also not rely on such
triplet to leave room for behavioral inconsistencies.
As a simplification, we assume that the information preference func-
tions are homogenous. That is, ∀r, βr = β,and β¯r = β¯.
Let us now state the recipient’s problem formally. Given the filter
strengths, disguise levels, email volume and actions of other recipients,
17Note that only high type recipients experience the dis-utility of I¯(dj)njr(1 −
1
djγj ) = (d
j)β¯
r
njr − (dj)β¯
r−1 njr
γj . For β¯
r = 0, such dis-utility becomes njr − n
j
r
djγj . High
type recipients suffer from the effective filtered volume not the information content.
For β¯r = β¯∗r ≡ log( 1−
1
γj
1− 1
djγj
)/ log dj , such dis-utility becomes njr − n
j
r
γj , high type re-
cipients are indifferent to any disguise levels associated with filtered censored-content
mail. To find β¯∗r,equate (dj)β¯
r
njr − (dj)β¯
r−1 njr
γj with n
j
r − n
j
r
γj getting:
(dj)β¯
r
(1− 1
djγj
) = 1− 1
γj
⇐⇒ β¯r log dj = log(
1− 1γj
1− 1djγj
) ⇐⇒ β¯∗r =
log(
1− 1
γj
1− 1
djγj
)
log dj
For β¯r ∈ (0, β¯∗r), such dis-utility is less than njr − n
j
r
γj . That is, conditional on the
same njr, high type recipients would suffer less with a smaller volume of disguised
mail filtered than a higher volume of undisguised mail filtered. For βr > β¯∗r, such
dis-utility is more than njr − n
j
r
γj . That is, conditional on the same n
j
r, high type
recipients would suffer more with a smaller volume of disguised mail filtered than a
higher volume of undisguised mail filtered.
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recipient r makes a binary choice of whether to read mail in the open
channel, κor ∈ {0, 1}, by maximizing:
U r(urdesired received, u
r
Type 1 errors, u
r
Type 2 errors) (8)
Proposition 1 With Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, recipients who have a
positive value for censored contents, and only they, will use also the
open channel.
Proof. The result is obtained straightforwardly from the three compo-
nents of (dis-)utility, (5)–(6). First, for a recipient who finds censored
content undesirable (φjl = 0), reading the open channel provides no ben-
efit, but creates dis-utility by increasing the amount of objectionable
mail (see the second summand in (6)). For a recipient who values cen-
sored content, reading mail in the open channel increases the second
summand in (5) (desired mail received). It has no effect on Type 1 er-
rors (6). Likewise it has no effect on Type 2 errors (7) because for the
open channel dj = γj = 1, so the second summand is zero when j = o.
Thus, if an open channel is introduced, h-type recipients will use
it to obtain benefit from desired commercial spam, but l-types, who
do not want spam, will not (as long as personal senders do not start
sending (much) to the open channel). We now turn to senders to find
the behavior of spammers when an open channel is introduced, after
which we analyze the advertisers’ problem, and the welfare effects of an
open channel.
3.3 The Senders’ Problem
We will describe in detail the cost and revenue functions of the censored-
content mass-mail senders only. Again, this is because the focus of the
paper is to move the supply of and demand for censored-content mass
mail out of the current email system.
The total cost function for mass-mail sender m, cm(n
o
m, n
c
m, d
c
m), re-
flects the costs of generating the email volumes, and of disguising mail
sent to the censored channel. The disguise cost is captured by ∂cm/∂d
j
m <
0, and the volume generating cost by ∂cm/∂n
j
m > 0.
18 We allow for
economies of scale in the sense of sub-additivity,
18Rather than having a zero marginal cost as commonly asserted, spammers incur
cost to renew technologies, which depreciate quickly, to generate spam. For example,
zombies (ie. home computers hijacked by crackers) are consistently destroyed by anti-
virus software, so spammers must continuously develop and distribute new viruses to
capture new (temporary) zombies. Zombies are responsible for relaying more than
60% of the world’s spam [Sophos, 2005].
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cm(n
o
m, 0, d
c
m)+cm(0, n
o
m, d
c
m) > cm(n
o
m, n
c
m, d
c
m), and cost complementar-
ity (ie., ∂
2cm
∂njm∂nim
< 0, i 6= j). To be concrete, we specify cm(nom, ncm, dcm) =
FCm+gm(d
c
m)+δn
o
mn
c
m+
1
2
(nom)
2+ 1
2
(ncm)
2, in which gm(d
c
m) =
1
dcm
−119,
so that the cost of no disguising (dcm = 1) is gm(1) = 0. Cost comple-
mentarity and subadditivity are both ensured by letting δ < 0.20 We
also assume a regularity condition of δ2 < 1.
On the revenue side, senders are price takers. Sellers of censored
goods pay them for solicitations. Let pj be the advertising charge per
disguised email ( n
j
m
djmγj
) reaching the users in channel j21.
On a practical level, the sender chooses whether to send to the cen-
sored or the open channel (or both). If sending to the open channel, the
sender does not disguise content, and adds a tag that indicates the mes-
sage should be delivered to the open channel. If sending to the censored
channel, the sender does not tag the message, and in fact may expend
some effort to disguise the content. We assume that mass mail sent is
distributed uniformly to the recipients in a given channel.
Given the prices and filter strengths, sender m chooses (nom, n
c
m, d
c
m)
to maximize:
pim(n
o
m, n
c
m, d
c
m) = p
onom +
pcncm
dcmγ
c
− cm(nom, ncm, dcm) (9)
s.t.
dcm ∈ [
1
γc
, 1]. (10)
Next we state the solutions to the above maximization problem:
19We could have used a decreasing marginal cost function such as g(dcm) =
1
(dcm)
2−1.
20Cost complementarity follows from δ < 0 because ∂cm∂ncm = δn
o
m + n
c
m, and
∂cm
∂nom
=
δncm + n
o
m. Subadditivty does as well because
cm(nom, n
c
m, d
c
m)− [cm(nom, 0, dcm) + cm(0, ncm, dcm)]
=FCm + gm(dcm) + δn
o
mn
c
m +
1
2
(nom)
2 +
1
2
(ncm)
2 − [FCm+
1
2
(nom)
2 + FCm + gm(dcm) +
1
2
(ncm)
2]
= δnomn
c
m − FCm < 0.
21In practice, there is a volume discount (that might or might not due to dimin-
ishing likelihood to respond). For instance, Send-Safe is a service spammers offer to
advertisers. One pricing scheme asks for US$125 per 1 million credits (a proxy of
njm
djmγj
) when an advertiser pays for 0.4 million credits. The price drops monotonically
to US$10 per 1 million credits when an advertiser pays for 300 million credits. This
pricing scheme is available at http://www.send-safe.com/send-safe.html.
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Proposition 2 The best responses of sender m are22:
Case (a), po ≤ pc
δγc
− γc(1−δ2)
δpc
:
d∗cm = 1;n
∗o
m =
1
1− δ2 (p
o − δp
c
γc
);n∗cm =
1
1− δ2 (
pc
γc
− δpo) (11)
Case (b), po ≥ pc
δ
− γc(1−δ2)
δpc
:
d∗cm =
1
γc
;n∗om =
1
1− δ2 (p
o − δpc);n∗cm =
1
1− δ2 (p
c − δpo) (12)
We next discuss the implications of Proposition 2.
Mass mail sent to a particular channel is increasing in the advertis-
ing price of that channel, and of the other channel only when there is
complementarity (δ 6= 0). Any possible increase is at a lower rate when
the complementarity is weak (i.e., |δ| is small). In fact, when comple-
mentarity is weaker, mass mail sent will be lower in both channels. Also,
as long as either po or pc is (or both are) strictly positive, there will be
mass-mail sent to both channels unless δ = 0. In other words, spam will
not be totally eliminated when δ 6= 0. When there is complementarity,
it is optimal to send some positive volume to the channel even though
the price there is zero. This is because this helps reduce the volume
generation cost in the other channel.
Notice that the marginal revenues of sending n∗om and
n∗cm
d∗cmγc
are po and
pc. Alternatively, one could regard the marginal revenues of each n∗om and
n∗cm
d∗cm
as po and p
c
γc
. To increase the total revenue in the censored channel
by the same amount, a sender could either adjust n∗cm or d
∗c
m, depending
on which is cheaper. Since the reciprocal of the disguise cost is linear and
the volume cost is convex, if they are on the same plane, they intersect
at one point. Left of this point, the volume cost is less convex, so the
marginal volume cost is less than the marginal disguise cost. Adjusting
volume but not disguising is cheaper. Right of this point, the opposite
happens. Disguising is cheaper so one will never increase n∗cm beyond the
intersection point.
The intuition for the effects of γc is the following. In case (a), d∗cm is
unchanged from the default level. The only degrees of freedom to ad-
justing revenue are n∗om and n
∗c
m. When γ
c increases, p
c
γc
decreases. Before
the change of γc, profit maximization must implies that the marginal
22For the trivial case of po = pc = 0, we have shown in Appendix 6.1 that:
d∗cm = 1;n
∗o
m = 0;n
∗c
m = 0.
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revenue p
c
γc
must equal some marginal cost. Thus, when p
c
γc
decreases, it
must equal some lower marginal cost. But since the total cost is convex,
n∗cm must be lowered conditional on the same or smaller n
∗o
m . This can be
confirmed from the best response of n∗cm in case (a), where both n
∗c
m and
n∗om are decreasing in γ
c. n∗om is decreasing in γ
c for a different reason.
Now we knew that an increase in γc decreases n∗cm. But the marginal
cost of sending nom is
∂cm
∂nom
= δncm + n
o
m, reducing n
∗c
m increases
∂cm
∂nom
since
δ < 0. Again, by equating the marginal revenue po with some marginal
cost, n∗om must be lowered. More generally, γ
c is negatively related to n∗om
and n∗cm. In case (b), d
∗c
m varies inversely with γ
c. In fact, d∗cm is at the
lowest bound of 1
γc
. In this case, only d∗cm adjusts because reducing d
∗c
m
is always cheaper than increasing n∗cm when γ
c changes. Again, since n∗om
and d∗cm are only related through n
c
m in
∂cm
∂nom
, when n∗cm is unchanged, so
is n∗om .
It is important to emphasize again that the volumes sent are not
necessarily the same as the volumes received. The latter is what the
recipients should be concerned about in addition to the disguise lev-
els. We defer the utility changes due to disguise levels until the welfare
analysis in the next section. With some intuition explained above, we
are ready to summarized the properties of volumes sent and received in
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Consider the two cases in Proposition 2.
(1) In the censored channel, the total volume of email received is: i)
increasing in both po and pc; ii) decreasing in δ; iii) decreasing in γc
in case a, and independent in case b. The total volume of email sent
is: i) increasing in po and pc, decreasing in pc; ii) unchanged in δ; iii)
decreasing, and unchanged in γc in cases a and b, respectively.
(2) In the open channel, the total volume of email received vis-a-vis sent
are the same by construction (i.e., n
∗o
m
d∗om γo
= n∗om). Such volumes are: i)
increasing in po and pc; iii) decreasing in δ; iv) decreasing, and un-
changed in γc in cases a and b, respectively.
Proof. In the censored channel, the total volume of email received are:
Case (a), po ≤ pc
δγc
− γc(1−δ2)
δpc
:
n∗cm
d∗cmγc
=
1
1− δ2 [
pc
(γc)2
− δp
o
γc
] (13)
Case (b), po ≥ pc
δ
− γc(1−δ2)
δpc
:
n∗cm
d∗cmγc
= n∗cm =
1
1− δ2 (p
c − δpo) (14)
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All directions of change here can be seen by inspection or straightforward
differentiations.
3.4 The Advertisers’ Problem
Advertiser a pays an advertising charge of pj for each email message that
passes through the filter in channel j. For each product or service sold,
the advertiser collects a sales revenue of s. The probability of purchase
is θj ≡ θ(
R
φ
j
t=1
Rj
, dja − dia) for each pj paid, where Rφjt=1 is the number of
high type recipients in channel j, and dja ∈ [ 1γj , 1] is the disguise level
associated with nja, which is the volume of email advertiser a asks the
spammers to successfully pass through the filter in channel j.23
Rφ
j
t=1
Rj
measures the average φjt in channel j.d
j
a−dia measures the informativeness
of the messages relative to the counterpart in the other channel. θ1 > 0
because of a higher propensity to purchase is tautologically associated
with a higher average φjt . θ2 > 0 because of an assumption that a greater
informativeness of the messages relative to the counterpart in the other
channel is assumed to facilitate purchase better.
The cost function consists of two parts: production and advertising.
The total production cost, k(
∑
j θ
jnja), is a convex function as usual,
where
∑
j θ
jnja is the total quantity of goods or services sold. The total
advertising cost,
∑
j p
jnja, is linear however. The spammer’s market is
competitive. Spammers as price takers treats the marginal revenue of
spamming, pj, as given. For such market to clear, pj must also equal
to the marginal advertising cost for the advertisers. Hence, the total
advertising cost is linear. In other words, it only chooses {nja}j=c,o to
maximize expected profits because {nja}j=c,o is sufficiently small among
the many advertisers that its advertising demand does not drive up or
down the marginal advertising cost pj. That is, pj is independent of
{nja}j=c,o. Of course, the aggregate level {
∑
a n
j
a}j=c,o will affect pj but
we will ignore this effect.
Mathematically, advertiser a chooses {nja}j=c,o to maximize:
23Note that θ is not a function of the volume of email advertiser a asks the spam-
mers to successfully pass through the filter in each channel. It is reasonable in the
sense that recipients are more likely to make a purchase if they are being repeatedly
reminded of, and that such volume is sufficient small so that each recipient is not
likely to receive multiple email by the same advertiser. We therefore rule out the case
in which the diminishing returns kick in a significant way when there are multiple
advertisers selling the same services or products.
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pia =
∑
j
[sθ(
Rφjt=1
Rj
, dja − dia)− pj]nja − k(
∑
j
θjnja) (15)
The advertisers’ maximization problem gives the marginal revenue
equals marginal cost condition:
∀j 6= i : pj = θj[s− k′(
∑
j
θjnja)] (16)
Now we will show the relationships between advertising charges in
each channel, before and after the implementation of the open channel.
(Note that we use∞ to denote variables when the open channel is absent.
When the open channel is absent, we define it by saying that δ = 0,
and po = 0 [or equivalently γo, γˆo → ∞]. Denote θ∞(Rφct=1
Rc
, dc,∞a ) as the
response function when the open channel is absent.)
Proposition 4 (i) The advertising charge in the open channel is weakly
higher than that in the censored channel (and than that in the censored
channel when the open channel is absent if a sufficient condition is met).
(ii) The advertising charge in the censored channel weakly decreases when
the open channel is implemented. (iii) The advertising charges are in-
creasing in the average propensity to purchase.
Proof. (i) By (16), po − pc = (θo − θc)[s− k′(∑j θjnja)]. Again by (16),
[s − k′(∑j θjnja)] is positive for positive prices. We just need to show
that (θo − θc) ≥ 0. By Proposition 1, Rφot=1
Ro
=
Rφot=1
Rφot=1
≥ Rφct=1
Rc
. Also, by
construction, doa = 1 ≥ dca. So doa− dca ≥ 0, and dca− doa ≤ 0. These imply
that θo ≡ θ(Rφot=1
Ro
, doa − dca) ≥ θ(
Rφct=1
Rc
, dca − doa) ≡ θc. Hence, we have
po ≥ pc. To have po ≥ pc,∞, by (16), we require a sufficient condition of
θo ≥ θc,∞ or equivalently:
θ(1, 1− dca) ≥ θ∞(
Rφct=1
Rc
, dc,∞a ). (17)
(ii) First, by Proposition 1,
Rφct=1
Rc
remains the same when the open chan-
nel is implemented because the high type recipients only use the open
channel additionally while continue using the censored channel. Sec-
ond, dca − doa = dca − 1 ≤ 0, so dc,∞a ≥ 0 ≥ dca − doa. These imply that
θ∞(
Rφct=1
Rc
, dc,∞a ) ≥ θ(
Rφct=1
Rc
, dca − doa). We have pc,∞ ≥ pc by (16) because
[s− k′(∑j θjnja)] and [s− k∞′(θc,∞nca)] are positive for positive prices.
(iii) Taking a derivative of (16) w.r.t.
R
φ
j
t=1
Rj
:
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∂pj
∂(
R
φ
j
t=1
Rj
)
= θj1[s− k′(
∑
j
θjnja)] + θ
j
∂k′(
∑
j θ
jnja)
∂(
R
φ
j
t=1
Rj
)
= θj1[s− k′(
∑
j
θjnja)] + θ
jk′′njaθ
j
1 ≥ 0
To solve for the sufficient condition in Proposition 4, one needs to
specify a functional form of the response function.
Assumption 5 The response function takes the form of an exponential
distribution. More specifically, θ(
R
φ
j
t=1
Rj
, dja − dia) ≡ 1− e−(
R
φ
j
t=1
Rj
+ed
j
a−dia ).
The sufficient condition takes a simple form under this exponential
distribution, which is 1− dca ≥ dc,∞a .24
3.5 Welfare
Proposition 5 Under a sufficient condition, the implementation of the
open channel decreases the volume of censored-content mass mail unfil-
tered in or sent to the censored channel and its associated dis-utility for
recipients who do not want it.
Proof. We have showed that n∗c,∞m ≥ n∗cm, n
∗c,∞
m
d∗c,∞m γc
≥ n∗cm
d∗cmγc
and I(d
∗c,∞)n∗c,∞r
d∗c,∞γc ≥
I(d∗c)n∗cr
d∗cγc in Appendix 6.2 under some sufficient conditions.
Whether such sufficient condition will be satisfied depends on the
values of the parameters and further specifying some functional forms,
which will necessarily restrict the generality of our results. We will leave
it as it is but instead offer some general intuition about when the suffi-
cient condition is more likely to satisfy. It is true that the introduction of
the open channel decreases the probability of a sale in the censored chan-
nel because θ(
Rφct=1
Rc
, dca − doa) ≤ θ(
Rφct=1
Rc
, dc,∞a ). Subsequently, p
c,∞ ≥ pc
as we have seen in Proposition (4). It does not necessarily imply that
after equating marginal cost with marginal revenue (pc,∞ and pc), the
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θ(1, 1− dca) ≥ θ∞(
Rφct=1
Rc
, dc,∞a ) ⇐⇒ 1− e−(1+e
1−dca ) ≥ 1− e−(
R
φ
j
t=1
Rj
+ed
c,∞
a ) ⇐⇒
(1 + e1−d
c
a) ≥
Rφjt=1
Rj
+ ed
c,∞
a ⇐⇒ 1− dca ≥ dc,∞a
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volume of email sent will decrease. This is because with the introduc-
tion of the open channel, senders benefit from complementarity so that
the marginal cost of sending is cheaper. In all, to the extent that the
complementarity effect does not crowd out the effect from the decrease
in marginal revenue, the volume of censored-content mass mail sent will
decrease. The associated dis-utility in turn will have to depend on the
tradeoff between the preference of information over volume as detailed
by the I(·) in the recipient’s problem.
Now we make one simplifying assumption before we analyze the wel-
fare effects.
Assumption 6 The uncensored-content mail senders do not change the
email volume they sent to the censored channel after the open channel is
introduced. That is, nˆcr = nˆ
c,∞
r .
Assumption 3 already implied that the uncensored-content mail senders
find it profit-maximizing to use only the censored channel. Assumption 6
further asserts that when the open channel is absent, the censored chan-
nel is no less or more productive for such senders. Of course, in reality, it
is possible to have a scenario that we nonetheless ruled out below. When
the open channel is absent, there could be much censored-content mail
in the censored channel (as we have shown in Proposition 5) that could
interfere with other communications such as uncensored-content mail.
Thus, with the introduction of the open channel, the censored channel is
becoming more productive for uncensored-content mail senders, and it
is possible that nˆcr ≥ nˆc,∞r . To be more precise, we rule this out because
we want to have a benchmark to compare the welfare with and without
the open channel. If one allows nˆcr ≥ nˆc,∞r to happen, then there might
be only welfare loss when the open channel simply because nˆcr becomes
very high and the dis-utility associated with the portion of this that is
wrongly filtered (at a rate of γˆc) completely offset the utility associated
with more (less) spam received for recipients who (do not) want it. We
therefore think Assumption 6 as a benchmark is reasonable.
Proposition 6 Under Propositions 1, 2, 4, 5, Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4,
and a sufficient condition, the welfare of the advertisers, censored-content
mass-mail senders and all recipients will be unchanged or increased when
there is an open channel.
Proof. The welfare of the censored-content mass-mail senders and ad-
vertisers will be unchanged because they make zero profit with and with-
out the open channel. The welfare of the recipients could differ. To
compare the welfare change for a given recipient when there is an open
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channel, we compare his or her utility after and before the roll-out of
the open channel in Appendix 6.325:
U r − lim
γo,γˆo−→∞
U r (18)
Our interpretation is that when the filter strengths associated with the
open channel are infinitely strong, it is as if there is no such channel for
any practical use.
Essentially, we have proved that each user’s utility has not decreased
after the roll-out of the open channel because the utility associated with
desired mail received does not decrease, and the dis-utilities associated
with Type 1 and 2 errors do not increase.
4 Implementation Issues
We emphasize that our proposal is a starting point. There are imple-
mentation issues, which are outside the scope of this research, that must
be addressed:
• Will the total trade volume of censored goods increase? Is it rea-
sonable to assume that the open channel simply shifts the supply
of such goods from other outlets?
• What is the magnitude of the marginal exposure of pornography
for minors in the open channel? Have they already been exposed
significantly by websites on the Internet? Should we add minimal
censorship to the open channel by blocking sexually explicit im-
ages or requiring credit card numbers to access the open channel?
Will the main argument still hold as long as the open channel is
significantly less censored than other channels? More generally,
what are the social implications if it is easier to obtain counterfeit
products or pirated software because of the open channel?
• The open channel is a typical problem of two-sided markets with
the sides of buyers and sellers. Is it desirable for the large email
service providers to unilaterally opt-in for all the recipients (so at
least one side of the market is on board)?26 Currently, Gmail lists
25Technically, the limit is well defined only if the disguise levels converge to zero
faster than the filter strengths to diverge to infinity (note: the bounds of a disguise
level is zero and 1 in the limit) because some of the denominators could otherwise
become zero’s. But the disguise levels will indeed not tend to zero. Since the disguise
cost is assumed to be convex, given a fixed advertising price, the senders cannot make
enough money to justify the increasing disguise costs when the disguise levels tend
to zero.
26Gmail, Yahoo!, and Hotmail are three largest online email service providers, each
with a market share close to 1/3.
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side-by-side some advertisements even for some spam messages.
Will the possibly increased email volume (at least email with cen-
sored contents) be sufficient incentives for the private provision of
the open channel? How many providers’ adoptions do we need
for the open channel to be effective? Are the customers willing to
switch to the few adopters?
• Will the open channel be flooded with email? Even if yes, the
email is not disguised. Will a search function sufficiently offset the
inconvenience of such flooding? Also, will spammers, who might
no longer disguise their identities, weed out each other (and their
associated volume) by establishing reputation? Lastly, will the
Type-2 errors associated with spam sufficiently small (so flooding
does not cause much inconvenience) as we have subsumed in the
definition of spam?
• What are the other reasons to stop spammers from sending per-
suasive advertising to the censored channel? Will the undisguised
mail in the open channel be sufficient threats to any persuasive
mail in the censored channel? Will sellers utilizing the open chan-
nel be able to undercut the price of any goods or services sold
in the censored channel since there is no need for them to incur
disguise costs?
5 Conclusions
We propose a principled approach to developing and analyzing spam
policies. Our approach is grounded in an economic, rational choice char-
acterization of the choices made by recipients, spammers, and advertis-
ers. Our novel insight is to induce the suppliers for and demanders of
commercial spam to move out of the current email system (a censored
channel), by providing an open channel in which those who want the
advertisements can find them. As a corollary benefit, resources are not
wasted on unproductive content disguising, and readers receive higher
quality (more informative) ads.
Technical filters and legal rules raise the cost of delivering spam to
readers. Costs are borne by advertisers (who must develop ever-changing
techniques for avoiding filters, etc.), but also by recipients, who spend
time doing the difficult filtering and reviewing that cannot be automated.
On the other hand, an equivalent reduction in the benefits of spamming
(e.g. by moving out spam demanders) should have the same incentive
effect. More generally, methods that channel communications more di-
rectly to those who want them would lower costs on both sides and be
welfare improving.
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In our mathematical model, we have shown that under certain con-
ditions, all email recipients are better off with the introduction of such
open channel: only recipients wanting spam will use the open channel en-
joying the less disguised messages, and for all recipients the satisfaction
associated with desirable mail received increases, and dissatisfaction as-
sociated with both undesirable mail received and desirable mail filtered
out decreases. We especially have taken into account of how recipients
trade off between information and volume by introducing the concept of
deviations from information neutrality.
We do not claim that our idea would provide a complete solution to
the current spam problem, but we do offer a novel new tool that, to-
gether with the other well-known tools (technical, legal and economic),
may contribute to a reduction in the flow of low-information, unsolicited
commercial bulk email. The ultimate solution, simple economics pre-
dicts, is for the value of purchasing stimulated by spam to fall sufficiently
low that it is less than the already low cost of sending spam. If we can
tempt a substantial number of consumers who want to purchase spam-
advertised products into a separate email channel (tempt them with the
expectation of higher quality, more informative ads to help them find the
products they want), the purchasing value remaining in the traditional,
filtered channel may drop sufficiently to start discouraging spammers
from using that increasingly unproductive channel.
In other words, we take a straightforward economic approach to the
question, by recognizing that there is not just a supply curve but also a
demand curve for spam. We model the incentives, within the ecosystem
of existing spam solutions, to induce both suppliers and demanders to
move out of the current censored channel and into the open channel. If
customers who want to purchase will benefit from more informative ads
in a separate channel, then spam advertisers will benefit from focusing
their advertising spending on that channel. This should not be a very
controversial idea, but it is, we believe, an idea that has been largely
missing from the debate.
There is another illuminating economic perspective on our work:
spam is fundamentally a problem that arises when disposal is not free.
We know from the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem that unregu-
lated free markets are generally Pareto efficient, but that result requires
free disposal. Spam is not free to dispose: it requires time to open and
consider. Some types of spam are malicious and may actually cause
harm to one’s data files or operating system before we can dispose of it.
Our proposal recreates a free market — the open channel — for those
who do not want to dispose of spam. It contrasts with other free-market
solutions (e.g. email stamps and bonds for email spam, and Google’s
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AdWords for web spam) in the following way. The open channel gives
the right to recipients to receiving spam; it removes the right of the email
service providers to decide whether the recipients should receive spam.
(More generally, the recipients’ right to choose the level of censorship is
one of the many other possible property right reassignments in the email
ecosystem that have been largely unexplored in the literature.) Also, we
provide those for whom the disposal costs are sufficiently high (not free)
the choice to opt out and participate only in the censored channel. Mean-
while, senders (and also spam demanders) do not internalize the disposal
costs of uninterested recipients, but the senders nonetheless choose to
send less to the censored channel because the average propensity to buy
falls as spam readers move to the open channel.
Of course, not all spam is designed to deliver informative advertising
messages to willing customers. A significant portion of spam is intended
to deceive readers (e.g., phishing and other scams), and other spam
messages are intended to persuade readers who may not have previously
thought they wanted to purchase a spam-advertised product (and thus,
who would not read the messages in the uncensored advertising chan-
nel). We do not suggest that our proposal will have a direct effect on
the quantity of misleading spam email (it might affect persuasive adver-
tising because a large fraction of those susceptible to this may already
be inclined to read the uncensored and more informative advertising
channel).
An open advertising channel is possible at low cost, and it is con-
ceivable that it would make email users at least weakly better off (no
worse off) than the status quo. At the very least, the solution is fully
reversible. If well-designed, an incentive-compatible advertising chan-
nel that harnesses the simultaneous forces of demand and supply could
significantly reduce the flow of unsolicited bulk commercial email.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The sender’s profit function is
pim(n
o
m, n
c
m, d
c
m) = p
onom +
pcncm
dcmγ
c
− cm(nom, ncm, dcm), (19)
the Lagrangian is:
L = pi(·)− λc1(dcm − 1) + λc2(dcm −
1
γc
) + µonom + µ
cncm (20)
where λc1, λ
c
2, µ
c, µo ≥ 0.
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The complementary slackness conditions are:
λc1(d
c
m − 1) = 0 (21)
λc2(d
c
m −
1
γc
) = 0 (22)
µonom = 0 (23)
µcncm = 0 (24)
FOCs:
po =
∂cm
∂nom
− µo = δncm + nom − µo
=⇒ nom = po − δncm + µo (25)
pc
dcmγ
c
=
∂cm
∂ncm
− µc = δnom + ncm − µc
=⇒ ncm =
pc
dcmγ
c
− δnom + µc (26)
−pcncm
(dcm)
2γc
− λc1 + λc2 =
∂cm
∂dcm
= g′m(d
c
m) = −(dcm)−2
1 =
pcncm
γc
+ (λc1 − λc2)(dcm)2 (27)
=⇒ dcm = (
1− pcncm
γc
λc1 − λc2
)1/2, λc1 6= λc2 (28)
Combining (25) and (26):
nom = p
o − δ( p
c
dcmγ
c
− δnom + µc) + µo
=
1
1− δ2 [p
o − δ( p
c
dcmγ
c
+ µc) + µo] (29)
ncm =
pc
dcmγ
c
− δ(po − δncm + µo) + µc
=
1
1− δ2 [
pc
dcmγ
c
− δ(po + µo) + µc] (30)
Before doing more substitutions in the above nonlinear equations to
solve for dcm, n
o
m, n
c
m more explicitly, we first see if we could eliminate
some cases below.
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Case 1: n∗om , n
∗c
m > 0 =⇒ µo = µc = 0.
From (29),
nom =
1
1− δ2 [p
o − δ( p
c
dcmγ
c
m
)] (31)
From (30),
ncm =
1
1− δ2 [
pc
dcmγ
c
− δpo] (32)
Subcase 1: d∗cm = 1 =⇒ λc2 = 0
From (31),
n∗om =
1
1− δ2 [p
o − δ( p
c
γcm
)] (33)
From (32),
n∗cm =
1
1− δ2 [
pc
γc
− δpo] (34)
From (27),
λc1 =
γc − pcn∗cm
γc
(35)
From (35), λc1 > 0 ⇐⇒
γc > pcn∗cm (36)
γc >
pc
1− δ2 (
pc
γc
− δpo) (37)
From (35), λc1 = 0 ⇐⇒
γc = pcn∗cm
γc =
pc
1− δ2 (
pc
γc
− δpo)
Therefore, subcase 1 is admissible when γc ≥ pc
1−δ2 (
pc
γc
− δpo), or
equivalently po ≤ pc
δγc
− γc(1−δ2)
δpc
.27
Subcase 2: d∗cm =
1
γc
=⇒ λc1 = 0
From (31),
n∗om =
1
1− δ2 [p
o − δpc] (38)
From (32),
n∗cm =
1
1− δ2 [p
c − δpo] (39)
From (27),
27The inequality reverses direction because we multiplied both sides by δ < 0.
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1 =
pcn∗cm
γc
− λ
c
2
(γc)2
(40)
λc2 = γ
cpcn∗cm − (γc)2 (41)
From (41), λc2 > 0 ⇐⇒
γcpcn∗cm − (γc)2 > 0 (42)
pcn∗cm > γ
c (43)
pc(pc − δpo)
1− δ2 > γ
c (44)
From (41), λc2 = 0 ⇐⇒
pcn∗cm = γ
c (45)
pc(pc − δpo)
1− δ2 = γ
c (46)
Therefore, subcase 2 is admissible when γc ≤ pc
1−δ2 (p
c − δpo) or
equivalently po ≥ pc
δ
− γc(1−δ2)
δpc
.
Subcase 3: d∗cm ∈ ( 1γc , 1) =⇒ λc1 = λc2 = 0.
Equation (27) and the premises for this subcase imply that:
γc = ncmp
c (47)
Substitute (47) into (32) to get28:
d∗cm =
(pc)2
(1− δ2)(γc)2 + δpopcγc (48)
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ncm =
1
1− δ2 (
pc
dcmγ
c
− δpo)
γc
pc
=
1
1− δ2 (
pc
dcmγ
c
− δpo)
δpo + (1− δ2)γ
c
pc
=
pc
dcmγ
c
d∗cm =
(pc)2
(1− δ2)(γc)2 + δpopcγc
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By d∗cm ∈ ( 1γc , 1), we must have
1
γc
<
(pc)2
(1− δ2)(γc)2 + δpopcγc < 1 (49)
Or equivalently,
pc
δ
− γ
c(1− δ2)
δpc
< po <
pc
δγc
− γ
c(1− δ2)
δpc
(50)
Note that the interval in which subcases 1 and 2 overlap is:
pc
δ
− γ
c(1− δ2)
δpc
≤ po ≤ p
c
δγc
− γ
c(1− δ2)
δpc
(51)
Note first that subcase 3 cannot coexist with either subcases 1 or 2
because the endpoints of the open interval of d∗cm in subcase 3 coincides
that of the other subcases. So the only possibility is that either of the
following is true (but not both). (a) subcase 3 is true; (b) subcases 1
and (or) 2 are true. Suppose (a) is true, then (b) is not true. But this
implies (50) and NOT (51) must be both true. This contradicts with
(50) being subsumed in (51). Therefore, subcase 3 is eliminated.
Case 2: n∗om > 0, n
∗c
m = 0
From (26),
ncm =
pc
dcmγ
c
− δnom + µc
0 =
pc
dcmγ
c
− δnom + µc
Since the right hand side is non-negative, the only permissible values are
pc = µc = n∗om = 0,which contradicts with n
∗o
m > 0.
Case 3: n∗om = 0, n
∗c
m > 0
From (25),
nom = p
o − δncm + µo (52)
0 = po − δncm + µo (53)
Since the right hand side is non-negative, the only permissible values
are po = µo = n∗cm = 0,which contradicts with n
∗c
m > 0.
Case 4: n∗om = n
∗c
m = 0.
From (25),
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nom = p
o − δncm + µo (54)
0 = po + µo (55)
Since the right hand side is non-negative, the only permissible values
are po = µo = 0.
From (26),
ncm =
pc
dcmγ
c
− δnom + µc (56)
0 =
pc
dcmγ
c
+ µc (57)
Since the right hand side is non-negative, the only permissible values are
pc = µc = 0.
n∗cm = 0 implies that (28) gives:
d∗cm = (
1
λc1 − λc2
)1/2 (58)
Subcase 1: If λc1 = 0 and λ
c
2 = 0, (27) implies a contradiction because:
pcn∗cm
γc
= 1 (59)
n∗cm =
γc
pc
6= 0 (60)
Subcase 2: If λc1 = 0 and λ
c
2 > 0, it gives a contradiction of d
∗c
m being
negative by (58).
Subcase 3: If λc1 > 0 =⇒ dcm = 1 (see (21)).
Therefore, case 4 is admissible when
dcm = 1; p
o = pc = 0 (61)
Q.E.D.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 5
We will show that n∗c,∞m ≥ n∗cm and n
∗c,∞
m
d∗c,∞m γc
≥ n∗cm
d∗cmγc
. And by homogeneity
of senders and even distribution of mass mail, it is equivalent to prov-
ing I(d
∗c,∞
m )n
∗c,∞
m
d∗c,∞m γc
≥ I(d∗cm )n∗cm
d∗cmγc
to show that I(d
∗c,∞)n∗c,∞r
d∗c,∞γc ≥ I(d
∗c)n∗cr
d∗cγc because
1
Rc
∑
m n
c,∞
m ≡ nc,∞r and 1Rc
∑
m n
c
m ≡ ncm.
Recall that when the open channel is present:
Case (a), po ≤ pc
δγc
− γc(1−δ2)
δpc
:
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n∗cm =
1
1− δ2 (
pc
γc
− δpo) (62)
n∗cm
d∗cmγc
=
n∗cm
γc
=
1
1− δ2 [
pc
(γc)2
− δp
o
γc
] (63)
I(d∗cm)n
∗c
m
d∗cmγc
=
I(1)n∗cm
γc
=
1
1− δ2 [
pc
(γc)2
− δp
o
γc
] (64)
Case (b), po ≥ pc
δ
− γc(1−δ2)
δpc
:
n∗cm
d∗cmγc
= n∗cm =
1
1− δ2 (p
c − δpo) (65)
I(d∗cm)n
∗c
m
d∗cmγc
= I(
1
γc
)n∗cm =
1
1− δ2 [
pc
(γc)β
− δp
o
(γc)β
] (66)
Again we use ∞ to denote variables when the open channel is ab-
sent. When the open channel is absent, it can be shown that we could
simply substitute δ = 0, and po = 0 (or equivalently γo → ∞) into the
above equations and the admissible ranges (but first multiply both sides
with δ for the ranges before the substitutions so the ranges will not be
undefined):
Case (a), pc,∞ ≤ γc :
n∗c,∞m =
pc,∞
γc
(67)
n∗c,∞m
d∗c,∞m γc
=
nc,∞m
γc
=
pc,∞
(γc)2
(68)
I(d∗c,∞m )n
∗c,∞
m
d∗c,∞m γc
=
I(1)nc,∞m
γc
=
pc,∞
(γc)2
(69)
Case (b), pc,∞ ≥ (γc)1/2 :
n∗c,∞m
d∗c,∞m γc
= n∗c,∞m = p
c,∞ (70)
I(d∗c,∞m )n
∗c,∞
m
d∗c,∞m γc
= I(
1
γc
)n∗c,∞m =
pc,∞
(γc)β
(71)
Without further specifying more functional forms of θj and k in the
advertiser’s problem, it is not possible to decide which case the para-
meters will fall into under the scenarios of whether the open channel is
present or absent, it may not be appropriate to compare the same case
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across scenarios. For example, it may not be appropriate to compare
the case (a) with the open channel with the case (a) without the open
channel. But we know that the case (b) variables at issues are always
weakly larger with and without the open channel when β ∈ [0, 1]. It is
then sufficient to show that the variables at issue in case (a) without the
open channel is always weakly larger than the counterpart variables in
case (b) with the open channel for β ∈ [0, 1]. Essentially, we will show a
sufficient condition so that:
n∗c,∞m,case a ≥ n∗cm,case b (72)
n∗c,∞m
d∗c,∞m γc case a
≥ n
∗c
m
d∗cmγc case b
(73)
I(d∗c,∞m )n
∗c,∞
m
d∗c,∞m γc case a
≥ I(d
∗c
m)n
∗c
m
d∗cmγc case b
(74)
In fact, the second inequality implies the third because I(d∗c,∞m )case a =
1 ≥ I(d∗cm)case b = 1(γc)β .
Equivalently, the second inequality can be rewritten as:
pc,∞
(γc)2
≥ 1
1− δ2 (p
c − δpo) (75)
And the first inequality can be rewritten as:
pc,∞
γc
≥ 1
1− δ2 (p
c − δpo) (76)
Note that the second inequality also implies the first inequality be-
cause (75) =⇒ (76).
Applying the first-order condition of the advertisers’ problem, we
have po = θo(s− k′); pc,∞ = θo,∞(s− k∞′). So 1
1−δ2 (p
c− δpo) = 1
1−δ2 (θ
c−
δθo)(s− k′) and (75) becomes:
θo,∞(s− k∞′)
(γc)2
≥ 1
1− δ2 (θ
c − δθo)(s− k′), (77)
where
Rφot=1
Ro
= 1 by Proposition 1. This is the first part of the
sufficient condition for this proposition.
For β > 1, we have to additionally show the second part of the
sufficient condition:
I(d∗c,∞m )n
∗c,∞
m
d∗c,∞m γc case a
∧I(d
∗c,∞
m )n
∗c,∞
m
d∗c,∞m γc case b
≥ I(d
∗c
m)n
∗c
m
d∗cmγc case a
∧I(d
∗c
m)n
∗c
m
d∗cmγc case b
,
(78)
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or equivalently:
pc,∞
(γc)2
∧ p
c,∞
(γc)β
≥ 1
1− δ2 [
pc
(γc)2
− δp
o
γc
] ∧ 1
1− δ2 [
pc
(γc)β
− δp
o
(γc)β
] (79)
Similarly, one could further substitute in the first-order condition of
the advertisers’ problem.
Q.E.D.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Assume the interchangeability of the limit signs for U r :
lim
γo,γˆo−→∞
U r(urdesired received, u
r
Type 1 errors, u
r
Type 2 errors) (80)
= U r( lim
γo,γˆo−→∞
urdesired received, lim
γo,γˆo−→∞
urType 1 errors, lim
γo,γˆo−→∞
urType 2 errors)
(81)
where (use ∞ as a superscript to denote the best responses of the
senders when γo, γˆo −→∞):
lim
γo,γˆo−→∞
urdesired received = (1− )
κcrnˆ
c,∞
r
γˆc
+
φctκ
c
rI(d
c,∞)nc,∞r
dc,∞γc
(82)
lim
γo,γˆo−→∞
urType 1 errors = 
κcrnˆ
c,∞
r
γˆc
+
(1− φct)κcrI(dc,∞)nc,∞r
dc,∞γc
(83)
lim
γo,γˆo−→∞
urType 2 errors (84)
= (1− )κcrnˆc,∞r (1−
1
γˆc
) + φctκ
c
rI¯(d
c,∞)nc,∞r (1−
1
dc,∞γc
) (85)
Since U r − limγo,γˆo−→∞ U r ≥ 0 if (a) urdesired received ≥
limγo,γˆo−→∞ urdesired received, (b) u
r
Type 1 errors ≤ limγo,γˆo−→∞ urType 1 errors, and
(c) urType 2 errors ≤ limγo,γˆo−→∞ urType 2 errors, we prove each of these in-
equalities below.
(i) Inequality (a) is urdesired received ≥ limγo,γˆo−→∞ urdesired received, or
equivalently:
∑
j∈{o,c}
(1− )κjr
nˆjr
γˆj
+
∑
j∈{o,c}
φjtκ
j
r
I(dj)njr
djγj
≥ (1− )κ
c
rnˆ
c,∞
r
γˆc
+
φctκ
c
rI(d
c,∞)nc,∞r
dc,∞γc
(86)
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Assumption 3 implies that (1− )κor nˆ
o
r
γˆo
= 0. Assumption 6 implies that
(1− )κcr nˆ
c
r
γˆc
= (1− )κcrnˆc,∞r
γˆc
. (86) becomes:
φctI(d
o)κorn
o
r
doγo
≥ φ
c
tκ
c
rI(d
c,∞)nc,∞r
dc,∞γc
(87)
The above is true for φot = 0 because both sides are zero. For φ
o
t = 1,
κor = κ
c
r = 1 by Proposition 1. Note that d
o = 1, γos = 1, and I(1) = 1.
(87) becomes:
nor ≥ nc,∞r (88)
To prove that nor ≥ nc,∞r . Let’s first look at the censored-content mass-
mail sender’s problem. For nom, the marginal revenue is p
o and the
marginal cost is ∂cm
∂nom
= δncm + n
o
m. For n
c,∞
m , the marginal revenue is
pc,∞
dc,∞m γc
and the marginal cost is nc,∞m (set δ = 0 in
∂cm
∂nc,∞m
= δno,∞m + n
c,∞
m ).
Profit maximization implies that each censored-content mass-mail sender
equates marginal revenue with marginal cost:
po = δncm + n
o
m (89)
and
pc,∞
dc,∞m γc
= nc,∞m (90)
By Proposition 4, po ≥ pc,∞. Together with dc,∞γc ≥ 1, we have
po ≥ p
c,∞
dc,∞m γc
(91)
Substitute the value of the above inequalities from the two profit maxi-
mization conditions above, we have:
δncm + n
o
m ≥ nc,∞m ⇐⇒ (92)
nom ≥ nc,∞m because δ < 0 ⇐⇒ (93)∑
m
nom ≥
∑
m
nc,∞m by homogeneity of senders ⇐⇒ (94)∑
m n
o
m
Ro
≥
∑
m n
c,∞
m
Rc,∞
since Rc,∞ ≥ Ro by Proposition 1 ⇐⇒ (95)
nor ≥ nc,∞r because by definition
∑
m n
j
m
Rj
= njr (96)
(ii) Inequality (b) is urType 1 errors ≤ limγo,γˆo−→∞ urType 1 errors, or equiva-
lently:
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∑
j∈{o,c}
κjr
nˆjr
γˆj
+
∑
j∈{o,c}
(1− φjt)κjr
I(dj)njr
djγj
≤ κ
c
rnˆ
c,∞
r
γˆc
+
(1− φct)κcrI(dc,∞)nc,∞r
dc,∞γc
(97)
Assumption 3 implies that κ
o
rnˆ
o
r
γˆo
= 0. Assumption 6 implies that κ
c
rnˆ
c
r
γˆc
=
κ
c
rnˆ
c,∞
r
γˆc
. (97) becomes:∑
j∈{o,c}
(1− φjt)κjr
I(dj)njr
djγj
≤ (1− φ
c
t)κ
c
rI(d
c,∞)nc,∞r
dc,∞γc
(98)
The above is true for φot = 1 because both sides are zero. For φ
o
t = 0,
because κcr = 1 and κ
o
r = 0 by Proposition 1, it is sufficient to prove for
all low type recipients that:
I(dc)ncr
dc
≤ I(d
c,∞)nc,∞r
dc,∞
, (99)
which has already been proved under a sufficient condition in Appendix
6.2.
(iii) Inequality (c) is urType 2 errors ≤ limγo,γˆo−→∞ urType 2 errors, or equiv-
alently:
∑
j∈{o,c}
(1− )κjrnˆjr(1−
1
γˆj
) +
∑
j∈{o,c}
φjtκ
j
rI¯(d
j)njr(1−
1
djγj
)
≤ (1− )κcrnˆc,∞r (1−
1
γˆc
) + φctκ
c
rI¯(d
c,∞)nc,∞r (1−
1
dc,∞γc
) (100)
Assumption 3 implies that(1− )κornˆor(1− 1γˆo ) = 0. Assumption 6 implies
that (1− )κcrnˆcr(1− 1γˆc ) = (1− )κcrnˆc,∞r (1− 1γˆc ). (100) becomes:
∑
j∈{o,c}
φjtκ
j
rI¯(d
j)njr(1−
1
djγj
) ≤ φctκcrI¯(dc,∞)nc,∞r (1−
1
dc,∞γc
) (101)
The above is true for φot = 0 because both sides are zero. For φ
o
t = 1,
because κcr = 1 and κ
o
r = 1 by Proposition 2, (101) becomes:∑
j=o,c
I¯(djs)n
j
r(1−
1
djγj
) ≤ I¯(dc,∞)nc,∞r (1−
1
dc,∞γc
) (102)
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But there is no Type 2 errors with censored-content mail in the open
channel because γo = 1 (implying do = I¯(do) = 1), so it is equivalent to
proving that:
I¯(dc)ncr(1−
1
dcγc
) ≤ I¯(dc,∞)nc,∞r (1−
1
dc,∞γc
) (103)
By Appendix 6.2, we already knew that under a sufficient condition,
ncr ≤ nc,∞r , and since I¯(·) is an increasing function, we just need to show
dc ≤ dc,∞ to prove (103). Since from Appendix 6.2, we already knew
that dc and dc,∞ are either 1 in case (a) or 1
γc
in case (b) depending
on the parameters that determined which cases will happen with and
without the open channel. Without the actual values of the parameters
or more specific functional forms, it is possible to tell whether we should
compare case (a) with the open channel with case (a) or case (b) without
the open channel, etc. We therefore will state a sufficient condition for
dc ≤ dc,∞ to hold. This sufficient condition is that the case (a) in the
with-open-channel scenario implies the case (a) in the without-open-
channel scenario, and that the case (b) in the without-open-channel
scenario implies the case (b) in the with-open-channel scenario.
Q.E.D.
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